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Dynamics of the Syrian Revolution (2)

Part Two:

Capitalism or Socialism: Challenges of the Revolution 

[Author's note: this is the concluding part of the series. To read Part One, click on this link: https://www.blakdwarf.org/post/dynamics-of-the-syrian-revolution ]


 A cousin of former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Controlled a vast business empire that spanned telecommunications, real estate, and banking.
 A cousin of former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Controlled a vast business empire that spanned telecommunications, real estate, and banking.

Syrian Capitalism in crisis: Neo-liberal Reforms and Rising Inequality 

The Syrian uprising of 2011 has  been portrayed almost exclusively  as a democratic movement against the tyranny of Assad. This one-sided narrative is then overlaid by  a perplexing landscape of ethnic and religious differences. What emerges is a  carefully crafted portrait, of confusion  that obscures the social and economic roots of the revolution.  


The decade after Bashar al-Assad’s took power in 2000 was the Syrian equivalent of Thatcherism in the UK. Under a similar banner of “rolling back the frontiers of the state”, the Ba’ath Party’s 10th Regional Conference in 2005, proudly proclaimed its adherence to  a “social market economy” facilitated by the privatisation of key industries and new openings for foreign direct investment (FDI).  


As the state withdrew from key areas of social welfare provision, the share of the private economy continued to grow, reaching up to 65 percent of Syrian GDP in 2010, while also being the largest employer.


FDI growth in Syria
FDI growth in Syria

By this time, approximately 75 percent of the Syrian labour force worked in the private sector. FDI which had registered a modest  $120 million in 2002 grew to $3.5 billion in 2010. 


The Syrian banking sector also opened up with  the Damascus International Bank heading a coterie of new private banks raking in huge profits from 2003 onwards.  This process was accompanied by the reduction in the quality and quantity of public health services, forcing Syrians to turn to the private sector to access basic services. Subsidies were also removed on key foods items as well as on gas and other energy sources, meaning that  products essential to everyday life grew increasingly unaffordable for most low-income families. 


The same policies applied to the agrarian sector resulted in traditionally common patterns of land ownership under capitalism. By 2008, just 28 percent of farmers had access to 75 percent of irrigated land, while 49 percent of them had only 10 percent,  



The state capitalist project was beginning to yield its essential, albeit extremely shallow, results. The new businessmen emerging from the incipient bourgeoisie nurtured by the state, grew more prominent in Syrian economic life, increasingly supplanting positions occupied by the older, more traditional bourgeoisie. 


This process of enrichment and class differentiation occurred within both the Alawite minority and the Sunni majority. It is true that a majority of the 10 wealthiest businessmen in Syria were Alawis, and most probably closely linked to the Asad family. However, this is only one side of Assad’s neo liberal reforms, which were designed to attract a broader tranche of private and foreign investment, particularly in sectors like banking, real estate, and tourism.


Although  privatisation of state assets and industries often resulted in their transfer to regime-affiliated cronies, they were not limited to them.  A new class of businessmen, many of them Sunni, emerged in key industries such as telecommunications, construction, and finance. This process was documented by the Swiss-Syrian journalist and scholar, Joseph Daher: 

 

Since the rise to power of Hafez al-Asad in 1970, the Syrian regime started a process of winning the favors and support of the private sector by implementing various economic liberalization measures directly. This was accompanied with increased connection and collaboration between sectors of the predominantly Sunni urban business community. The private sector businessmen, who were once classified as an important threat to the economic and political control of the regime, progressively became a significant component of it and were increasingly integrated into its various institutions. 


It is interesting to note that the majority of the businessmen were from a Sunni background, with the exception of the inner circle of crony capitalists. According to an analysis published in the Syrian magazine Al-Iqtisad Wa Al-Naql in 2011, from the list of the 100 most important businessmen in Syria, 23 percent of them were children of high officials, or their partners or acting as their “interfaces”; 48 percent were new businessmen” 

 

It is clear from the above that the Syrian uprising  of 2011 wasl a direct  product of a class struggle rooted in the crisis of capitalism. Although the new Syrian bourgeoise may have wanted the uprising to succeed in the beginning, with few exceptions they were reluctant to participate in the protest movement and chose to adopt a wait-and-see stance. At best, some business elites decided to leave Syria and transfer most of their capital outside of the country. Thus, by the end of 2012, total withdrawals from Syrian banks were estimated to be around $10 billion. Even in some of these cases, the flight of capital received the blessing of Assad as a means of avoiding sanctions.  


 

The role of the Syrian bourgeoisie is clearly reflected in the stance of the leadership of the Syrian Negotiating Commission (SNC) and the National Coalition for Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (SOC), which for years had distanced itself from the Syrian people and chose instead to rely upon NATO forces to impose a solution which would align with their class interests.  


Bourgeois opposition leadership descending the steps of the European Union mission in Damascus 
Bourgeois opposition leadership descending the steps of the European Union mission in Damascus 

Whether it was directly connected to Assad or not, the Syrian bourgeoisie was the main beneficiary of Assad’s reforms. While they enriched themselves, Syrian workers and peasants were driven to the wall. 

 

  •  between 1980 and 2000 average incomes fell by around 10 percent. 

  •  unemployment was officially at 9 percent, but the real figure was closer to 20 percent.  

  • reduced state investment in public services and infrastructure led to deteriorating living conditions for many Syrians.  

  • the regime also reduced subsidies on agriculture, fuel, and food which  left rural communities vulnerable to market fluctuations and stripped them of the safety net they had historically relied upon. 

 

Russia: the new imperialism 

It should be noted that the economy as a whole continued to be  relatively underdeveloped, with agriculture still accounting for 27 percent of GDP and employing  around 30 percent of the workforce.  Like its Egyptian forerunners,  the state capitalist model could go no further.  

 

Following the collapse of the USSR, Syrian underdevelopment  was becoming more exposed and saddled with huge foreign debts. Russia was now  becoming the dominant source of incoming foreign capital,  benefitting from major investments in oil and gas, infrastructure projects (most notably in the long term operating lease Port Tartus)   and enjoying particularly generous terms in  phosphate mining where Syria boasts the world’s fifth largest reserves.



Russian naval forces, Port Tartus, 2019
Russian naval forces, Port Tartus, 2019

In 2018. Assad signed a 50 year contract giving the  Russian company, Stroytransgaz, a near monopoly over this sector. This came at the expense of the Syrian state, which was set to lose 70-75% of the revenues of phosphate exports. 

 

On the other hand, Syrian imports from Russia were valued at $594.44 million during 2021. The unequal terms of trade and investment, which have traditionally characterised relations between Western imperialism and the Third World, now included a new axis.

 

Russian strategic investments in Syria  have  been a contributing factor in the social crisis leading to the 2011 uprising and civil war. The many reported grievances over poor pay and safety conditions arising from new employment contracts imposed by the Russian bosses , led further down the road to strikes at the fertiliser plants and in Tartous Port in 2019 and 2020 respectively :  Even though Russian capital was not hegemonic, its presence in Syria was and remains  indicative of a new imperialism at work, fostering a  contingent dependency that has favoured  Russian oligarchs at the expense of Syrian workers and peasants.  Indeed, as the war progressed, the predatory nature of Russian capital revealed itself in a series of deals whereby Russian companies working with mercenary outfits such as Wagner acquired stakes in Syrian oil and gas fields in return for fighting ISIS.

 

Russian capital investment in phosphate mining and infrastructure projects became an intrinsic element of Assad's neoliberalism, which spilled over into the civil war:

 

“Moreover, the privatisation in the phosphate sector triggers more socioeconomic problems. This process cannot be traced back to conditions of war and sanctions, it is rather a continuation of the pre-war neoliberal course,which re-allocates income and resources in favour of the regime’s business cronies. The public-private partnership at work in the state-owned companies involved in the phosphate chain is having a negative impact on the Syrian economy and state revenues. It increases injustice and places socioeconomic pressure on thousands of employees. The recent workers’ protests and strikes in Tartous Port are an indicator of the growing dissatisfaction and a warning sign of instability in the absence of a reliable state.”  

(Russian Investment in Syrian Phosphate: Opportunities and Challenges, Azzam Al-Allaf and Salam Said, Middle East Directions, November, 2020) 

 

Russian economic preponderance in Syria is one of the factors conditioning the hostility  between Moscow and its rivals in Europe and the USA. As Syria emerges from the shadows of Assad’s tyranny, these economic ties with Russia will have a major bearing on its future. Assad and his family may well enjoy safe haven in Russia, but Russian capital still has no exit strategy.


Evolution of the HTS

The constellation of forces which emerged in the aftermath of the 2011 uprising contributed significantly to the derailing of the revolution.  In the context of an unfolding civil war, the mass struggle was pushed back and the vacuum of working class leadership was inevitably filled by  an undergrowth of Islamist groups armed and financed by the United States, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. 

 

On the other hand, there was the secular Free Syrian Army (FSA), formed by officers who had defected from  Assad’s Syrian Armed Forces .  The FSA  was notoriously corrupt and did not offer a positive vision of a different kind of society, where people’s needs would be met. It was the Islamists who appeared to present a coherent response  to social grievances. They distinguished themselves from the secular rebels by being far less corrupt, and in areas they controlled, they prioritized issues like bread distribution.  


By 2019, the HTS had already broken from its Islamic fundamentalist roots and was developing a more liberal version of Islamic rule. This shift was registered by the current HTS leader, Abu Mohammad al-Julani, in an interview wtih CBS correspondent Martin Smith: 


So if we agree that there's an Islamic rule in the liberated areas, we say that there are universities, by Allah's grace, full of students, two-thirds being female students. There are more than 450,000 to 500,000 students enrolled in schools. There are fully functioning hospitals in the liberated areas, and there are people working to build towns and pave roads. Others are trying to establish an economic system for people to live securely and peacefully. And there's a judicial system that seeks to give people back their rights and not only to punish the wrongdoers in the way some people would think, when they hear it is an Islamic or a Salafi group.” 


The HTS had not evolved into a revolutionary socialist movement, but it was giving voice to the class roots of the crisis. This was explained by the  journalist  Anand Gopal: 


So the dominance of Islamism in the revolution was not simply because of outside intervention — although foreign states, especially Turkey and Qatar, certainly pushed things along in that direction. It was due, ultimately, to the nature of the Assad regime and to the class divisions within the uprising itself.”   (Anand Gopal, Syria: What Comes After the Despot?, https://jacobin.com/2024/12/syrian-revolution-assad-hts-democracy


The Kurdish question

As early as 1965, the Ba’ath party decided to build the 350 km long and 10-15 km wide Arabian belt along the Syria–Turkey border to change the demographics of the Kurdish regions of Syria in favor of the Arabs. As a result, about 2,000,000 hectares (20,000 km2) of Kurdish cultivated land were taken away and given to the newly settled Arabs. Around 140,000 Kurds living in 332 villages were displaced from their homes by the Syrian government; and tens of thousands of Arabs - mostly from the Raqqa region- established settlements in the confiscated lands


Turkey today is pursuing a very similar policy of expelling the Kurds and settling Sunni Arabs in the regions it occupies in northern Syria.  Since the occupation of Afrîn by Turkey, the majority of the Kurdish population has been displaced. The Kurdish population fell from 97 percent to less than 35 percent. The colonisation project was described by the journalist Joshep Daher as follows:


“The Kurdish population in Syria has been discriminated against since the establishment of the state in 1946. Kurds have suffered the banning of their language and cultural celebrations, endured policies of Arab colonisation, been deprived of nationality and basic social rights, and faced the under-development in areas where they formed a majority.” 


The settlement programme peaked under the regime of Hafez al-Assad. As Kurdish village names were arbitrarily replaced with Arab ones, the colonisation was justified by some on the left on the grounds that the establishment of Syrian state farms were in the forefront of the confiscation of Kurdish lands.


War and autonomy

As the regime was bogged down in the war with the armed opposition groups, the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and several allied groups voted in 2016 to create an autonomous federation in the northern part of Syria. Representatives of the Kurdish, Arab, and Assyrian communities, along other ethnic groups, met to discuss bringing three Kurdish-led autonomous areas under the umbrella of a federal system.


The newly declared region, known as Rojava, or the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), consists of three distinct enclaves, or cantons, under Kurdish control in northern Syria: Jazira, Kobani and Afrin. 


Syria’s Kurds effectively control an uninterrupted 400km of territory along the Syrian-Turkish border from the Euphrates River to the frontier with Iraq, where their neighbouring  Iraqi Kurds have enjoyed autonomy since the early 1990s.  In response to the ongoing peace talks sponsored by the EU, Taj Kordsh, a spokesman for the Syrian Democratic Forces  (SDF) declared: 


“We feel that the world powers are using us as a tool to push forward their agendas. It is now our right to protect ourselves. We do not support dividing Syria, but we expect an equal and fair outcome from the peace talks, and we have not seen any.” 


As part of this stance, there was a large measure of peaceful co-existence between Assad and the Kurds, with the latter deploying their forces primarily against ISIS and Turkey.  Other than sporadic, practical and logistical agreements in the early stages of the civil war, there was no strategic or long term military coordination between the YPG  and the armed opposition to Assad. According to Yusuf Can, of the Wilson Center,


“The [AANES] maintained a pragmatic but fragile relationship with the Assad regime . . . defined by limited coordination against common threats,” ,   (https://jacobin.com/2024/12/kurds-syria-assad-hts-dannes


Kurds’future 

The Kurdish women’s battalions, known as the YPJ (Women’s Protection Units) are a central part of the  Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) a multi-ethnic coalition of mainly Kurds  and  Arabs, but including  Assyrian, Turkmen, and other ethnic groups. 


With US backing, the SDF spearheaded the military campaign that ousted ISIS   from their last territory in Syria in 2019. Despite Turkish incursions and although AANES is not a completely contiguous region, the Kurdish-led administration there has enjoyed almost complete autonomy. 


In line the the ideology of the PKK’s central leader, Abdullah Öcalan,  the administration is based on a neo-libertarian notion of direct democracy, gender equality, ecological sustainability and a social system described as “a societal economy "  in which  “the economy and society work closely together on the basis of cooperatives.”  


Jinwar, the site of a former state farm, now a women-only village in North-East Syria where women work and live together with their children
Jinwar, the site of a former state farm, now a women-only village in North-East Syria where women work and live together with their children

It is certainly the case that the cooperatives have created more employment opportunities for women, with many of the co-ops being run exclusively by women who are reported to earn between  30,000 and  45,000 SYP (Syrian pounds), equivalent to aound  $50-$75 a month, from the sale of their products. 


This represents only half of the average monthly wage in the AANES, but it has  allowed many  women to gain financial independence.


However, most of the cooperatives are only small enterprises employing a handful of workers, and the strategically important areas of production (such as electricity, gas and oil) are either under the direct control of AANES Commissions and Offices or are still operated by private enterprises, including US companies. 


The scholar and journalist, Dilar Dirik, one of the most authoritative advocates of the AANES experiment, explained these limitations as follows:


“Despite such perspectives and projects, the anti-capitalist promise of Rojava’s economy remains compromised. The US extracts Syrian oil in SDF-held areas while imposing heavy sanctions on the country. Wealthy individuals and businesses gauge investment opportunities as many areas remain in need of reconstruction and development. The revolutionaries’ vision of communal economies does not always match with demands on the ground, especially of members of the wealthier classes who do not benefit from them.”( The Kurdish Women’s Movement: History, Theory, Practice, pp227, Dilar Dirik,  Pluto Press, 2022) 


The  AANES Charter of 2016  does not replace private property with libertarian municipalism. On the contrary, it enshrines private property, which is portrayed as being complementary to the public sector.  In reality, AANES remains dependent on landowners and businessmen, particularly in real estate and construction,  to service and manage its economy. In addition, the region’s economy is bound up with the Syrian economy as a whole: 


“Despite the PYD’s perceived unchallenged control of the AANES, a parallel power structure operated by the Syrian regime still continues to exist in key economic sectors of the region, which remain relatively dependent on Damascus.............. The finances of the AANES are closely intertwined with and dependent on the rest of the country and have failed to create an independent communal economy as proclaimed in its Charter of the Social Contract .”    (The Political Economy of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, Sinan Hatahet, European University Institute 2019) 


This applies even more so to the oilfields where the AANES lacks the capability to restore or create new refineries to process its oil production.  


The Kurdish leadership and the new regime 

Unlike the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in neighbouring Iraq, the leadership in Syria has never opted for independence, preferring instead to maintain and strengthen its regional autonomy as part of a federal set-up. This remains its stance today as it argues for a pluralist constitutional settlement. Its current stance is clearly articulated in a recent interview with  Ilham Ehmed, cochair AANES’ Department of Foreign Relations: 


The transitional government led by HTS must not become the new regime. A new transitional government must be created that includes Sunnis, Kurds, Christian Arameans, Armenians, Druze, Alawites, and all population groups in Syria, especially women. This is the only way to prepare elections and a new constitution in line with Syria’s social diversity. Regardless of Julani’s background, these principles must apply to a democratic future for Syria.”  (https://jacobin.com/2024/12/erdogan-syria-turkey-kurds-assad)  


This was confirmed  officially by Mazloum Abdi, the SDF commander in chief, who declared: 


"We agree that we are for the unity and integrity of Syrian territory and reject any division projects that threaten the country's unity,"  


After the SDF and the HTS-led government had met in Damascus on December 30 to discuss the future of the Kurdish enclave, UN Special Envoy to Syria, Geir Pedersen, confirmed that : 

"channels of dialogue have been established between the caretaker authorities and the SDF, who met last week in Damascus. Public statements suggest the charting out of positions but not yet the prospect of imminent agreement." 


An official in Damascus said that talks with SDF delegates were “positive”


A working class roadmap for reconstruction 


i. Self-determination for Syria - End the sanctions now! 

Both the voracious appetite of the bourgeoisie under Assad and his defence of that throughout the  war, caused huge suffering for the Syrian masses, made ten times worse by Western sanctions. 


The World Bank estimated that Syria's GDP contracted by 84% between 2010 and 2023, plummeting to approximately $6.2 billion in 2023. Syria's national currency  lost about 90 percent of its value since the start of the civil war in 2011, plummeting from 50 pounds to 12,000-15,000 to the US dollar. The collapse of the currency has made imports prohibitively expensive, worsening shortages of essential goods like food, medicine, and fuel. 


An estimated 90% of the population lives below the poverty line, with unemployment rates calculated at over 27% as a whole and around 33% amongst young people. Inflation is in the region of 28%.The direct impact of the war has seen thirteen million people  forced to leave their homes for safety and 2.4 million children unable to attend school .According to the Syrian Center for Policy Research (SCPR), the  conflict has destroyed around 40% of Syria’s infrastructure at a cost of US$117.7 billion.  


With the electrical power infrastructure virtually destroyed, current production providess electricity to citizens for just two hours a day and  sometimes less. An estimated $40 billion is required to restore it.  


The  overall cost of reconstruction is estimated to range between $250 billion and $400 billion 


Despite this dire state of the Syrian economy, the USA, the EU and Westminster are continuing with their sanctions and weaponising them to fashion Syria’s poltical future in line with European and US economic interests in the region. Even after the fall of Asaad, Western demands are still based on  the UN  Security Council Resolution 2254 of 2015.  None of these  apply to other pro-Western regimes in the region. Nor do they include protection of workers’ rights. 

 

Besides being  a flagrant violation of Syria’s right of self-determination, the sanctions   contribute massively to the country’s general impoverishment. As part of a general  restriction on  Syria's ability to trade internationally and attract foreign investment, key sectors, such as oil and gas have been crippled by export bans and operational challenges. Ending these sanctions would not only allow a large measure of economic recovery, but would send a clear signal that Syria’s future is in the hands of its people and the country’s own governance.  


         ii.   For a constituent assembly 

The HTS caretaker regime has delayed plans to frame a new constitution, saying that it will take around 3 years to prepare. Effectively, this would be 3 years during which the Syrian people have no say in government policy and the huge tasks of social and economic reconstruction. On the other hand, the Syrian bourgeoisie – both at home and abroad – will be offered almost unrestricted investment openings and the  opportunity to shape the country’s economic future.  


As one part of a working class road map for reconstruction, the immediate convocation of a constituent assembly would open up the political space to advance a broader programme of struggle to meet the pressing needs of Syria’s workers and peasants. One way of beginning that struggle could lie in the establishment of   local citizen assemblies tasked with  drafting a new constitution, as well as framing the architecture  of the constituent assembly itself.  


      iii.    For independent trades unions 

The ability of the working class to shape its future will also depend upon freeing the existing trades unions from the fetters of the Asaad state. Although the independence of the trades unions would be a central article of a new constitution, the task of  democratising the unions and ridding them of their Ba’athist  leadership cronies, cannot be dependent on such an outcome. 


Assad cronies at 20th Congress of GFTU, 2020
Assad cronies at 20th Congress of GFTU, 2020

These cronies are still in position  and will undoubtedly try to find the wriggle room to sit out the rest of their term in office. However, it is clear that the circumstances  of Assad’s demise has provided new oxygen for the emergence of a genuine rank and file movement. 




The union cronies’ power base has been largely shattered and the popular mood is for a clear out of the entire regime. This is an opportune time to call local, regional and national union conferences to forge a fighting leadership and ensure that the unions are at the forefront of meeting the tasks of reconstruction.  


         Iv.           A programme of public works 

Repairing the colossal damages caused by Asaad’s war is an immediate necessity in virtually every area of social and public services. Whether it be in health, education, transport, electricity ,water supplies or housing, there is a dire need for a programme of public works to meet the most basic needs of survival and reconstruction.  Only a co-ordinated effort - with central planning that services the inherently integrated nature of such a programme -  is capable of meeting this challenge.   


The billionaire capitalists who continue to run the Syrian economy cannot be entrusted with this task. The state needs to marshall all the resources at the country’s disposal without being held to ransom by the demands of  profitabiilty and shareholder dividends. Should the construction firms, financial institutions and manufacturers of essential products refuse to engage with this reconstruction, they should be nationalised immediately.  


Such a course, the minimum needed to confront these war torn extremities, raises the most basic question of all:  whose class interests  is the state serving? This question applies to the whole of Syria, regardless of any ethnic or religious affiliation.  


A democratic and progressive bloc? 

It seems clear that the existing government of the HTS  favours rebuilding the country on a capitalist basis. This was indicated by Bassel Hamwi, the president of the Federation of Syrian Chambers of Commerce, who stated that the new government told business leaders that they would adopt a free-market model and integrate the country into the global economy. The Minister for the Economy,  Basil Abdul Aziz, confirmed this course when he  declared that there were plans to shift from state control towards a stronger free-market model and liberalization of import-export control. 


Writing in the journal, The New Arab, Joseph Daher counterposes the  alternative of a democratic and progressive bloc: 


“In the end,” wrote Dahler,  “only the self organisation of popular classes fighting for democratic and progressive demands will pave the path towards actual liberation.” 


The author then attempted to flesh out this perspective with the following proposals:


“To advance demands such as democracy, social justice, equality, Kurdish self-determination, and women’s liberation in order to build solidarity among the country’s exploited and oppressed, Syria’s progressives and democrats will have to build and rebuild popular organisations from trade unions to feminist movements, community groups, and national structures to bring them together. In this context, the construction of autonomous and mass labour organisations will be essential to improving the living and working conditions of the population and more generally to struggle in favour of democratic rights and an economic system based on social justice and equality.” 


Taken by themselves, the proposals appear to be a perfectly acceptable part of advancing the struggle. However, apart from being quite vague – there are no specific demands or suggestions as to how these mass organisations might come into being or develop  – taken as a whole, they do not represent an alternative to the caretaker government.  


A “democratic and progressive bloc”  could well become a rehash of previous disasters in which  the class struggle was deferred and eventually destroyed in order to maintain unity with so-called progressive forces. At best it would a Venezuelan type of 'third way' between captialism and socialism, which has proved to be a total dead end yielding a social and economic castastrophe for the Venezuelan masses.


For a workers’ and peasants’ government 

There is no question but that the mobilisation of the Syrian masses will  require popular organisations and an  unwavering  fight for  democratic rights and social reforms. But in and of themselves these two elements do not represent a solution.  The entire modern history of Syrian development over the last two centuries is littered with capitalist failures, including in the Kurdish northeast. 


This in itself is living proof that a socialist alternative offers the only way forward.  The pursuit of that alternative requires specific demands – democratic, social, economic and political –  around which the Syrian people can organise and mobilise.  Nevertheless, this ultimately poses the question of political power and the need  for a workers’ and peasants government that can lead a real transition from capitalism to socialism. 


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[To read Part One of this series, click on this link: https://www.blakdwarf.org/post/dynamics-of-the-syrian-revolution ]

 

 



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